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APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 26 (2)(a), U.C.A. §77-18a-l(l)(a) and U.C. A §78-2a3(2)(e), whereby an appeal from the court of record in criminal actions may be taken on appeal to
this Court from a final order for anything other than a first degree or capital felony. Appellant is
also appealing as a matter of right under Rules 3 and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue
Defendant/Appellant Watson raises one primary issue for appeal.
1.

Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution to the Victims'
Reparations Fund as part of Defendant/Appellant's sentence.
Standard of Review

This Court will "accord a lower court's statutory interpretations no particular deference
but assess them for correctness, as we do any other conclusion of law." Salt Lake City v.
Emerson, 861 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah App. 1993).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS
Defendant/Appellant submits the following as representative of determinative law:
a.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(b)

b.

Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201(l)(e)(i)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the case:
Defendant/Appellant was ordered, as part of her sentence, to pay restitution to the

Victims' Reparations Fund. Counsel for Defendant/Appellant objected to the order of restitution
and a hearing was held on the matter. Following the hearing, the judge issued an order that
Defendant/Appellant pay an amount to be determined by the Victims' Reparations Fund.
II

Course of the proceedings and Disposition at the trial court:
On or about April 13, 1998, a hearing was held to determine if restitution was appropriate

under the present set of facts. Following arguments made by Counsel for the State and
Defendant/Appellant, the trial court ruled that restitution was appropriate. Counsel for
Defendant/Appellant objected again and filed a Notice of Appeal.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On or about July 23, 1996, a homicide occurred in a northeast neighborhood of Salt Lake
City, Utah. The victim was Lonnie Durazo. Appellant was originally charged with the murder of
Mr. Durazo because she allegedly drove the vehicle used during the crime. (R. at 10). All murder
charges were dropped following plea negotiations.
Appellant agreed to plead guilty to a charge of Attempted Obstruction of Justice. (R. at
41). In support of this conviction, the State relied on the fact on August 8, 1997, Appellant sold
the car allegedly used during the crime. This was over one year after the crime occurred. (R. at
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41).
The only admission made by Appellant to the sentencing court that were related to this
crime consisted of the following:
(R. at 42, Defendant's Statement)
"My conduct, and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crime charged are as follows: I attempted to dispose of physical
evidence in a criminal case by allowing it to be sold to another person, to wit: a car." (R. at 42).
Other statements made by Appellant consisted of the following:
(Transcript of sentencing, February 2, 1998) (Beginning on P. 6 L. 11)
The Court: Go ahead, ma'am.
Ms. Watson: Basically, I just want to say that I know I have been caught in the middle of a
situation which I guess I have inappropriately acted. I feel really bad about it. It has
caused me a lot of emotional stress and it is all I guess my fault. I realize, you know, the
importance of leading a straight life. I feel really bad. I want to apologize to the victim's
family.
Then, on April 13, 1998, Appellant again addressed the trial court with the following
statement:
(Beginning on p. 8 L.15)
The Court: Ms. Watson, is there anything you want to say on your own behalf?
Ms. Watson: Yes. I've spent a lot of time in jail and I have had a lot of time to think. I
have decided-I took a class while I was in prison and it really woke me up to the way that
my own life affects me and how I affect others and how I can be productive. I have really
been putting into practice something I went to every day, something I had to read 13
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books to go through the required class-the requirements for the class. I have been
persistent in coming to some understanding of what my life has been up to this point and
what I would like to take and do with it. I would like to further my education. I want to
grow up and , I don't know, it is really hard for me to accept this. It is something that has
been really hard to think that one day, you know, you could be here and the next day you
could be gone. I really apologize for my misconduct. It is something that won't leave me.
It is not going to leave me in my life. Forever when I go to sleep, you know, I have a
conscience. It is not like it is never going to affect me. It affects me everyday. And that
is my problem, you know. I have got to deal with it but that is what I am working on. I
would like to apologize again.
(Transcript of sentencing, page 8, April 13, 1998).
The sentencing court was aware that it was limited in the sentence it could impose. The
court stated so during sentencing:
(Beginning on P. 9 L. 24; April 13, 1998)
The Court: First of all, let me say that I recognize that there is nothing I can do, quite
frankly, through this sentencing here today, to really assist the victim's family or bring the
victim backfromthe underlying homicide offense. In this particular case, even though this
obstruction charge is in the context of a homicide case, I am obviously legally bound to
sentence Ms. Watson for the offense that she pled guilty to and that was an obstruction
charge and not a homicide charge.
The Record is void of any statements made by Appellant other than those cited above. In
light of this, the order of restitution was erroneous and should be vacated by this Court.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-20l(l)(b) (Supp. 1996) defines "criminal activities" as "any
offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant
admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
•5-

criminal conduct." Appellant was convicted of Attempted Obstruction of Justice because she sold
the car that was allegedly used during the commission of the crime. The crime occurred on July
23, 1996 and the car was sold on August 8, 1997. Appellant submits that she never admitted any
responsibility to the sentencing court for any criminal conduct nor was there any causal
relationship between the charge she was convicted of and the order of restitution.
ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (Supp. 1996) governs orders of restitution. U.C.A§76-3201(l)(e)(i) defines a victim of a crime as "any person who[] the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.'' (Emphasis added).
"Criminal activities" is defined as "any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with
or without an admission of committing the criminal conduct." U.C.A. §76-3-20 l(l)(b) (1996).
(Emphasis added). The Order of Restitution in the case at bar was unauthorized because
Appellant never admitted responsibility for criminal conduct related to any losses suffered by the
victims in this case.
The United States Supreme Court held in Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 109
L.Ed. 2d 408 (1990), that an award of restitution is authorized only for the loss caused by the
specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction.
The Appellant in that case was originally charged with three counts of theft by a United
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States Postal Service employee and three counts of use of unauthorized credit cards. Pursuant to
plea negotiations, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to one of the counts in exchange for the
government dropping the other five. During the plea proceedings, the government proffered
evidence that Appellant had stolen more credit cards than were contained in the one count to
which he was pleading. Appellant's counsel informed the district court that Appellant's plea was
limited to the one count and that Appellant had not made admissions to anything other than the
facts pertaining to that count.
The government proposed at sentencing that Appellant be ordered to pay restitution which
included losses from counts other than the one to which Appellant had plead. Appellant argued
that he should be required to pay restitution only for the losses listed in the count for which he
was convicted. The district court and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed with
Appellant.
The Supreme Court held that the district court's order of restitution was unauthorized and
reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that as a practical matter there was no
Congressional intent to include in the restitution calculus any losses beyond those caused by the
offense for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 418. Moreover, the Court held that had
Congress intended to permit a victim to recover for losses stemmingfromall
conduct attributable to the defendant, including conduct unrelated to the offense of
conviction, Congress would likely have chosen language other than "the offense,"
which refers without question to the offense of conviction.
Id. (Emphasis added).
-7-

The government argued on appeal that the practice of plea bargaining would undermine
victims' ability to recover fully for their losses. The Court addressed this argument with a
commonsensical analysis:

[i]f a prosecutor chooses to charge fewer than the maximum possible number of
crimes, the potential recovery of victims of crime is undoubtedly limited, but so
too is the potential sentence that may be imposed on a defendant.
Id
One year after the Hughey decision, the Tenth Circuit held that an Order of Restitution,
which encompassed losses stemming from charges which did not result in convictions, was
unauthorized and thus was illegal and constituted plain error on the part of the district court.
United States v. Wainwright, 938 F.2d 1096 (10th Cir. 1991).
In that case, the Appellant was originally charged with a seven-count indictment.
Pursuant to plea negotiations, Appellant plead guilty to one of the counts. At sentencing, the
district court ordered Appellant to pay restitution that included losses from the dismissed counts.1
The court held that since the Order contained losses stemming from charges which did not result
in a conviction, the order was illegal and must be vacated. Id. At 1099.
The Utah Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of restitution in State v. Galli, 345
l

. The loss suffered by the banks that had been defrauded totaled $9,927.00. The count
Appellant was convicted of totaled a loss of $700.00. The district court ordered restitution in the
amount of $4,963.00, which was half the loss identified by the banks and included $350.00 of the
$700.00 loss identified in the count appellant was convicted of. On remand, the court instructed
that the order of restitution include only the $350.00 which represented a portion of the loss
identified in the count which resulted in a conviction.
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Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 1998 WL 312808 (Utah). The Court held that in order for restitution to be
applicable, a defendant must admit responsibility to the sentencing court. Id at 8 (citing U.C. A.
§76-3-201(l)(b))). The "plain wording of section 76-3-201 (l)(b) requires that the defendant
admit[ ] responsibility to the sentencing court..." (Emphasis in original text).
The Appellant in that case argued the trial court misinterpreted U.C. A. §76-3-201 when it
ordered him to pay restitution to his family after he absconded from the jurisdiction, resulting in
the family forfeiting bail. The Court held that since Appellant did not admit responsibility for bail
jumping, "bail jumping [was] not a criminal activity for which restitution was proper under 76-3201(4)(a)(i)." Id at 8. The Order of Restitution was properly determined to be erroneous.
In applying the law outlined above to the facts of the case at bar, it is clear that the Order
of Restitution in this case was erroneous. Appellant was originally charged with criminal
homicide. (R. at 9). Pursuant to plea negotiations, Appellant agreed to plead guilty to Attempted
Obstruction of Justice. (R. at 41-47). The facts supporting this conviction stemmed from the fact
that Appellant sold the vehicle used in the crime. (R. at 42). The crime with which Appellant was
originally charged occurred on or about July 23, 1996, and the car was sold on or about August
8, 1997. (R. at 41-42).
The government argued in the Hughey case that plea bargains, like the one in the case at
bar, ultimately undermine victims' ability to recover their losses. However, as the Supreme Court
established in that decision, the law supports that the potential recovery of victims of crime is
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limited when a prosecutor chooses a lesser charge, and it follows that the potential sentence must
also limited. See, Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. at 418.
The losses related to the conviction of Attempted Obstruction of Justice are not, in any
plausible interpretation, related to the Order of Restitution. In other words, Appellant did not
cause the victim's losses or damages by selling the car over one year after the crime was
committed. Thus, an Order which requires Appellant to pay restitution to the Victims'
Reparations Fund was erroneous.
U.C.A. §76-3-201(l)(b) (Supp. 1996) defines criminal activities as
any offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without
an admission of committing the criminal conduct.
The Supreme Court held in Hughey that had Congress intended to permit a victim to
recover for losses stemming from all conduct attributable to the defendant, including
conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction, Congress would likely have chosen language
which would refer to conduct other than the conviction." Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. at
418. Appellant asserts the same argument here. Had the Utah Legislature intended a victim to
recover from losses stemming from all conduct attributable to Appellant, it would be included in
U.C.A. §76-3-201. A fundamental principle "of statutory construction is that unambiguous
language in the statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning."
Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Bd, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988).
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Appellant finds no language in §76-3-201 that indicates that a victim shall be compensated
for losses stemming from charges that did not result in a conviction. Since the conviction was
Attempted Obstruction of Justice, which resulted from Appellant selling her vehicle, that
conviction is not related to the victim's losses in this case, and thus the Order of Restitution
should be vacated.
CONCLUSION
Appellant prays that this Court vacate the Order of Restitution because her conviction was
not related to the victim's pecuniary damages nor did she admit responsibility for any other
criminal conduct to the district court.
DATED this / I day of January, 1999.
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David C. Cundick
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF S.ALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER OF
: ,

RESTITUTION

Plaintiff,
-vs-

:
Case No. 971015103

ELLIE WATSON,
Defendant.

:
:
:

Judge Medley

On the 22nd day of June, 1998, the Court heard arguments on the defendant's opposition to
payment of restitution. The defendant was represented by her attorney, David C. Cundick. The
State of Utah was represented by Carlos Esqueda. The Court, having considered the arguments of
counsel and for good cause appearing, now enters the following
ORDER
1.

Defendant Ellie Watson is hereby ordered to pay restitution in such amount as have

been made of the Victim's Reparation's Fund relating to the death of Lonnie Durazo.

1

2.

Adult Probation and Parole is to contact the Victim's Reparation's Fund and report

to the Court the amount of restitution owed and to contact the defendant to arrange for monthly
payments of such amount.
DATED this

/ /

day of August, 1998.
BY T I ^ COURT

./nU^L
The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, *.. Third/D/strict Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Vincent Meister,
Attorney for State of Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the -2th- day ofJtrfy, 1998,1 caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following parties at the addresses indicated.
Vincent Meister, Esq.
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

nr

